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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND,
WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE PRICE
RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE
GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE
PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS
EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN
RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH

No. 20030156-SC

GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
Objector and Appellee,
v.
JERRY D. OLDS,
Utah State Engineer and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(3)(J) and 78-2A-3 (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues: (1) Whether section 73-4-11 of the Utah
Code can be construed to allow more than 90 days for some water users to file objections
to the proposed determination when the language of the statute and Utah Supreme Court

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case law require water users to file objections within 90 days of the date of service, and
(2) whether objections filed in 1993 and 1999 relate back to the original 1973 objection
when the subsequent objections are labeled as supplements but raise completely new
issues and have no common issues of fact, law, or evidence.
Both are issues of the proper interpretation of sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-10 of the
Utah Code. 'The interpretation of a statute . . . presents a question of law, which this
court reviews for correctness." Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, % 4, 53 P.3d
473; State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, % 12, 52 P.3d 1257. "A
trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard; we afford
no degree of deference to a trial judge's determination of the law." United States Fuel
Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, % 9, 79 P.3d 945 (citations
omitted).
Review of these issues is occasioned by the trial court's Memorandum Decision,
Addendum 1 (R. 439-446), in which the trial court denied the State Engineer's Motion to
Dismiss (R. 31-32). The State Engineer argued the issues presented here, thereby
preserving them for review by this court. See Notice, Receipts and Waivers (R. 13, 14);
Mem. Supp. State Engineer's Mot. Dismiss Green River Canal Company's Objections to
the Proposed Determination (R. 33-51); Reply Mem. Supp. State Engineer's Mot.
Dismiss Green River Canal Company's Objections to the Proposed Determination and
Mem. Opp'n Green River Canal Company's Mot. Extend Time for Filing Protests, or
Alternatively, Dismiss (R. 157-176); Supplemental Cases and Docs. (R. 329-346); State
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law2Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Engineer's Resp. Supplement of Green River Canal Company (R. 347-363); State
Engineer's Second Supplemental Mem. (R. 427-438); Tr. Hr'g (R. 454: 2-76, 109-139,
144-156).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of a portion of section 73-4-11
of the Utah Code that states:
After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the
surveys, records, and files, and after a personal examination of the river
system or water source involved, if such examination is deemed necessary,
the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed determination of
all rights to the use of the water of such river system or water source, and a
copy of the same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from
such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district court a written
objection thereto duly verified on oath.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). Section 73-4-10 states:
The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition, statement
or pleading; to extend a provided in this title the time for filing any
statement of claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing
any other pleading, statement, report or protest.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Utah and other western states have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine of
water rights. See Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1224

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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(Utah 1994). Under the prior appropriation doctrine, "as between appropriators, the first
in time shall be the first in rights." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989). A prior
appropriator is entitled to divert and use its entire water right before water users with later
priority water rights may divert any water. See Warren Irrigation Co. v. Charlton, 197 P.
1030, 1032 (1921). At the same time, water rights are limited to the amount that can be
beneficially used. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (1989). In an arid state such as Utah, where
water is almost always scarce, disputes about priorities and quantities are inevitable.
Without the adjudication statutes, each water user might have to engage in many lawsuits
against neighboring water users to establish respective water rights. Each water user
could be plaintiff in many lawsuits and defendant in others. The same issues potentially
could be tried in different cases, with a possibility of conflicting judicial decrees. To
mitigate such situations, Utah and most other western states established statutory general
adjudication procedures so that all water rights within a given river system could be
adjudicated in a single comprehensive lawsuit.
In Utah, Title 73 Chapter 4 of the Utah Code sets forth the general adjudication
procedure. This Court has described the basic procedure as follows:
As this court recognized in Smith v. District Court, 69 Utah 493,
498, 256 P. 539, 544 (1927), the purpose of the general adjudication
process is to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to
provide a permanent record of all such rights by decree. Once the general
adjudication is initiated, the state engineer is required to give notice to all
water users of record and to give further notice by publication. Utah Code
Ann. § 73-4-4. Water users then submit their water user claims, outlining
their respective claims to the water use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-5.
The state engineer prepares a hydrographic survey of the river
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

system and evaluates various water user claims. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3.
After a full consideration of the claims, surveys, records, and files, the state
engineer publishes a proposed determination of water rights. Utah Code
Ann. § 73-4-11. A copy of the proposed determination is either mailed or
hand-delivered to each claimant for review. Within ninety days after such
service, any water user dissatisfied with the proposed determination may
file an objection with the district court. The court then hears evidence and
renders judgment on the contested claims. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-13 & 15. Absent a protest, the district court must enter judgment in accordance
with the proposed determination. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12.
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289-90 (Utah 1992).
As this Court described in Jensen, the State Engineer has allowed water users to
appear in person to obtain a copy of a proposed determination. Id. (noting that Mr. Jensen
received a copy of an earlier volume of the proposed determination in person); see also
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ^| 14, 79
P.3d 945 (agent of water user was served in person with a copy of the proposed
determination and signed a receipt and consent form); Murdoch v. Springville Mun.
Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994) (noting that proposed determinations may be
mailed or hand-delivered to each claimant). To establish the date of service, the water
user signs a "Notice, Receipt and Waiver" form. See United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, %
14. The Notice, Receipt and Waiver establishes the date the water user received the
proposed determination.

See Notice, Receipt and Waivers (R. 13,14); Notice, Receipt

and Waiver for Green River Canal Co., Addendum 2 (R. 13). It notifies the water user
that any objections to the proposed determination must be filed with the district court
within ninety days from the date of service. Id. By signing the Notice, Receipt and

5
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Waiver form, the water user waives further service in connection with the proposed
determination and consents to a judgment on the proposed determination unless the water
user files an objection within ninety days from the date of service. Id.
The State Engineer mails copies of the proposed determinations to all water users
who choose not to obtain them in person, then prepares "Affidavits of Mailing" to
document the date the proposed determinations were mailed to the respective water users.
See Affidavits of Service by Mailing (R. 16-31). After serving the proposed
determinations on the water users, the State Engineer compiles the signed Notice, Receipt
and Waiver forms and the Affidavits of Mailing, andfilesthose documents with the
district court. See Certificate of Filing (R. 16). The date of service for each water user
and the waivers of further service by water users who signed the Notice, Receipt and
Waiver forms become part of the court record. See, e.g., Jensen, 844 P.2d at 290 (noting
that the affidavits of mailing were part of the court record).
In Utah, the general water right adjudications take a long time. A number of
general adjudications, including the Price River general adjudication, have been
underway for more than twenty years. It may be many years from the time the proposed
determinations are served until the objections are litigated, appealed, and a final decree is
entered. Cf. Murdoch, 878 P.2d at 1148 (a lawsuit filed by Salt Lake City in 1936 was
converted to a general adjudication for the Utah Lake and Jordan River drainage in 1944,
and was still under way). During the time the general adjudication is in progress, section
73-4-11 requires the State Engineer to administer the water rights in accordance with the
6
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proposed determination (except for previously decreed water rights). Utah Code Ann. §
73-4-11 (1989). The statute thus provides for the orderly administration of water rights
during the long pendency of the general adjudication.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Fourth Judicial District Court in Duchesne, Utah (now the Eighth Judicial
District), by order, initiated the general water rights adjudication for the lower Green
River and its tributaries in Utah, including the Price River, on March 20,1956. See
Proposed Determination of Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River, Book
5 at i (R. 1: i). Because that large area was too unwieldy and difficult to adjudicate in one
proceeding, the court later ordered the Price River general adjudication to be separated
from the other areas. Id.
In the Price River general adjudication, the State Engineer notified the water users,
prepared detailed maps of the entire area (referred to as the hydrographic survey),
collected the Statements of Water User's Claims from water users, and prepared the
proposed determination of water rights as directed by section 73-4-3 of the Utah Code.
See id. (R. 1: i-ii). The Proposed Determination of Water Rights for the Price River
Drainage was published in six volumes. Books 1 through 5 contained the water rights in
respective areas of the river drainage, and Book 6 contained supplemental information
and indices. (R. 1, 2).
Book 5 of the Proposed Determination contained water rights located in the
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vicinity of Green River City, Utah, including Water User's Claim 91-294, a water right
owned by Green River Canal Company (Company). Addendum! 3 (R. 1: 1143). Water
User's Claim 91-294 was recognized in the Proposed Determination Book 5 with an
irrigation duty of four acre-feet per acre per year, a flow of 60 cubic feet per second
(c.f.s.) for irrigation of 1,443.50 acres and stock water during the irrigation season, and 20
c.f.s. for stock water during the non-irrigation season. Id. The Proposed Determination
Book 5 also contained the following notice:
Pursuant to Section 73-4-11 U.C.A. 1953, you are hereby notified
that any claimant dissatisfied with said Proposed Determination must file
with the Clerk of the above entitled Court a written objection thereto duly
verified on oath within ninety (90) days from and after the date of service of
this Proposed Determination upon you.
(R. 1: notice page); see also Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) (directing the State
Engineer to give notice of the requirements for filing objections).
On December 15, 1972, Delbert Tidwell, the Company secretary, signed a Notice,
Receipt and Waiver acknowledging receipt of the Proposed Determination for the Price
River and Lower Green River Drainage, Area Code 91, Books 5 and 6. Notice, Receipt
and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13: (alphabetical under Green River Canal Company)). The
Notice, Receipt and Waiver documents the date of service to the Company, notifies the
Company in two separate sections that any objections must be filed within ninety days
from the date of service, and concludes with the following statement waiving further
service by mail and consenting to a decree unless a protest to the proposed determination
is filed within ninety days:
8
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And the undersigned waives any further service in connection
therewith [to the Proposed Determination] and consents to the
entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is
made by the undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court
within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof. [Dated
and signed.]
Id. The Company therefore had until March 15, 1973, to file objections.
The Company filed four objections, described in Table 1.

TABLE 1
, SUBJECT

OBJECTION

DATEFILED
(DAYS LATE)

1973 Objection
(Addendum 4)

June 20, 1973
(97 days late)

Increase irrigation duty
from 4 to 5 acre feet per
acre per year

First 1993 Objection
(Addendum 5)

June 18,1993
(20 years and 95 days late)

Increase irrigation duty
from 4 to 6 acre feet per
acre per year

Second 1993 Objection
(Addendum 6)

June 18,1993
(20 years and 95 days late)

Disallow Green River City
hydro-power water right

1999 Objection
(Addendum 7)

October 14, 1999
(26 years and 212 days
late)

Increase irrigation season
flow from 60 c.f.s. to 80
c.f.s.

On June 20, 1973, ninety-seven days after the end of the statutory ninety-day
objection period, the Company filed an objection (1973 Objection) contending the
irrigation duty granted in the Proposed Determination Book 5 should be changed from
four acre-feet per acre per year to five acre-feet per acre per year. Addendum 4 (R. 3).
On June 18, 1993, twenty years and ninety-five days after the end of the statutory
9
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ninety-day objection period, the Companyfiledtwo additional objections. One (First
1993 Objection) again raised the issue of irrigation duty as addressed in the 1973
Objection, asserting that the irrigation duty should be increased from four to six acre feet
per acre per year. Addendum 5 (R. 4).
Also on June 18, 1993, the Company filed another objection (Second 1993
Objection). In the Second 1993 Objection, the Company asserted that water right 91-39,
a hydro-power water right owned by Green River City, should be disallowed because it
had been forfeited for non-use. Addendum 6 (R. 5).
On October 14, 1999, twenty-six years and 212 days after the end of the statutory
ninety-day objection period, the Company filed an objection (1999 Objection), which it
captioned "Supplemental Protest by Green River Canal Company to the Proposed
Determination of Water Rights." Addendum 7 (R. 6). In the 1999 Objection, the
Company asserted that Water User's Claim 91-294 should have been recognized for 80
c.f.s during the irrigation season rather than 60 c.f.s. Id. This is the objection at issue in
this litigation and appeal.1

1

The 1973 Objection and the first 1993 Objection are now moot because the State
Engineer published an addendum with revised irrigation duties for the Price River
drainage. The Company could resolve the Second 1993 Objection at any time byfilinga
private action for forfeiture of the Green River City water right outside the general
adjudication. In addition, the Companyfiledan Application to Appropriate additional
water if it does not succeed on the 1999 Objection. (R. 342-343). The Company is
seeking by this action to gain the additional water at an earlier priority than the adjacent
water user, Mr. Thayn. (R. 368). The dispute with Mr. Thayn was the subject of the case
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, 486 Utah Adv. Rep 34. See 1999
Objection and its Exhibit A, Addendum 7 (R. 10-12).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law10
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When discussions to resolve the issue raised in the 1999 Objection proved
fruitless, the State Engineer filed a motion to dismiss all four Company Objections
because the Company did not file them within ninety days after it received the Proposed
Determination, as required by section 73-4-11. (R. 31, 33). In response, the Company
filed a memorandum opposing dismissal on grounds of laches, waiver, equal protection,
uniform operation of laws, and default. (R. 58, 69-73). The Company alsofileda motion
to either extend the objection period to include its objections, or to dismiss the entire
Price River and Lower Green River general adjudication proceedings. (R. 55, 64-69, 7478). Both parties filed response and reply memoranda and supplemental memoranda as
directed by the trial court. (R. 157, 186, 328, 346, 363, 395). The trial court held a
hearing on June 14, 2002. (R. 396). After the hearing, the parties submitted
supplemental memoranda as directed by the trial court. (R. 426, 438).
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
On February 7, 2003, the trial court issued the "Memorandum Decision on Utah
State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss and Claimant Green River Canal Company's Motion
to Dismiss and/or Extend Time for Filing Objections" (Memorandum Decision).
Addendum 1 (R. 439). In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court denied the State
Engineer's motion to dismiss the objections. Id. at 5 (R. 443). The court expressed
concern that not all water users had received their proposed determinations at the same
time, id. at 2, 4 (R. 440,442), reasoning that water users who received the proposed
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determination at a later date had an advantage over water users who received it earlier, id.
at 4 (R. 442). The court believed that the legislature intended all water users to receive
the proposed determination "almost contemporaneously," and for this reason intended
service under section 73-4-11 to be by mail. Id. The trial court concluded that "[i]f all
objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all claimants should have 90 days to
present their objections under 73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed
using the date of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is on file herein
which affects each area." Id. at 4-5 (R. 442-43). The last Notice, Receipt and Waiver
form was signed by Joseph Novak on June 4, 1974.2 Id. at 5 (R. 443). The trial court
held that the 1973 Objection was therefore timely. Id.
The trial court reasoned that the State Engineer's "decision not to comply strictly
with the statutory language" gave the trial court "legal latitude" for its decision. Id. The
trial court also reasoned it had "equitable grounds" because of the State Engineer's delay
in filing the motion to dismiss. Id. The court then stated it was "further treating the
'supplemental filings' by that company as merely amendments and/or specifications to the
original filing." Id. Because the 1973 objection was filed "before 90 days after June 4,
1974," the court held that all four objections were timely. Id. Finally, the trial court
denied the Company's motion to dismiss the entire Price River and Lower Green River

2

Joseph Novak is a prominent water attorney who practices in Salt Lake City. He
is not listed as a water right owner in the alphabetical index in the Proposed
Determination Book 6. The trial court probably was unaware that Mr. Novak was not
actually a water user.
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general adjudication, and denied "the Canal Company's request for additional time to file
claims except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the statutory scheme allows
additional time to file the objection herein." Id. at 5-6 (R. 443-44). In denying the
Company's motion for extension of time to file objections, the trial court made no finding
of "due cause" required by the extension provision in section 73-4-10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it interpreted section 73-4-11 to allow water users to file
objections until ninety days after the last date of service of any copy of a proposed
determination in the Price River general adjudication. Water users who voluntarily
receive their proposed determination in person and who expressly waive further service of
the proposed determination mayfileobjections within ninety days from the date they are
individually served. The plain language of section 73-4-11 and Utah case law require that
the objection period for each individual ends ninety days after that individual is served a
copy of the proposed determination.
Section 73-4-12 provides that a water right that is uncontested at the end of the
ninety-day objection period must be decreed in accordance with the proposed
determination. United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT
49, ^| 15, 79 P.3d 945. While section 73-4-10 allows the trial court to grant extensions for
filing objections, the only way to reconcile sections 73-4-10. II, anc

s if the trial

court can grant extensions only when the motion for extension is filed before the end of
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the statutory ninety-day objection period.
There are sound policy reasons for the way the legislature established this statutory
framework. Ending the objection period after ninety days allows water users time to
investigate and file objections, while imparting security to water rights and stability to
river systems after the objection period has ended. On the other hand, if the objection
period doesn't expire until after the last proposed determination is served, or if the trial
court can extend it retroactively, then there is no security or stability. Instead, no one
knows in advance when the objection period actually ends, and no one knows which
objections are timely until the trial court decides when the objection period ended.
A water user cannot circumvent the statutory ninety-day objection period in section
73-4-11 simply by calling a late objection a supplement or amendment to an earlier
objection. The court should look at the substance of the later objections, not the label. If
a later objection is not the same as the timely objection in its subject matter, legal issues,
and factual issues, it is a late objection and should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE NINETY-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD IN SECTION 73-4-11 CANNOT
BE RETROACTIVELY EXTENDED OR MODIFIED
A.

WHEN WATER USERS CHOOSE PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE
PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE
SERVICE BY MAIL, THE OBJECTION PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN
ON THE DATE OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICE

The trial court held that the objection period "should be computed using the date of
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the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is on file herein which affects
each area." Memorandum Decision at 4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 442-43). The trial court held
that this date was June 14, 1974. Id. at 5 (R. 443). This ruling is in error because the
objection period for the Company began to run when the Company received the Proposed
Determination Books 5 and 6 on December 15, 1972,
Section 73-4-11 of the Utah Code states that the State Engineer "shall formulate a
report and a proposed determination . . . and a copy of the same shall be mailed by regular
mail to each claimant with a notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within
ninety days from such date of mailing file . . . a written objection thereto." Utah Code
Ann. §73-4-11 (1989).
As described above, the State Engineer has allowed water users who choose to do
so to receive proposed determinations in person. On December 15,1972, the secretary for
the Company received copies of the Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 and signed a
Notice, Receipt and Waiver. Notice, Receipt and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13:
(alphabetical under Green River Canal Co.)). In the Notice, Receipt and Waiver, the
Company acknowledged receipt of the proposed determination and waived further service
by mail. Id. The Notice, Receipt and Waiver stated, "And the undersigned waives any
further service in connection [with the proposed determination] and consents to the entry
of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is made by the undersigned claimant
to the above-entitled court within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof" Id; cf.
Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co., 179 P. 984, 987 (Utah 1919) (shareholders in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter LawI Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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irrigation company may waive their statutory rights of notice of shareholders' meeting);
Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same).
The United States Supreme Court addressed personal service and service by mail
inMullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Although
Mullane addressed service of notice in the context of due process, the Court's discussion
of the hierarchy of methods of service and its reasoning are instructive. The Court held
that personal service is best, stating, "Personal service of written notice within the
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding."
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; see also id. at 320. Notice by mail is permissible in some
situations, id. at 319, and in a few circumstances, service by publication in a newspaper is
allowable, id. at 320. Personal service of proposed determinations therefore affords a
higher form of service than service by mail. By this standard, the State Engineer has
traditionally exceeded the requirements of section 73-4-11, and did so in this case.
Acknowledging the efficacy of personal service, water users who received personal
service waived service by mail by signing the Notice, Receipt and Waiver forms. (R. 13,
14).
The Company received its Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 on December
15, 1972. The Company's decision to receive its volumes of the Proposed Determination
by personal service was completely voluntary. The Company representative signed the
Notice, Receipt and Waiver form in which the Company expressly waived further service
i

of the Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 and consented to entry of a decree in
16
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accordance with the Proposed Determination unless it filed a written objection with the
clerk of court within ninety days after the date of service. Notice, Receipt and Waiver,
Addendum 2 (R. 13). Under these circumstances, the ninety-day objection period began
to run on the date of service to the Company. The Company did not file an objection
within ninety days from the date it received its Proposed Determinations. All of the
Company's objections were therefore late, in violation of section 73-4-11, and the trial
court erred by not granting the State Engineer's motion to dismiss the objections.

THE NINETY-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD APPLIES TO EACH
WATER USER INDIVIDUALLY
Regarding the construction of statutes, this Court has said:
In interpreting statutes, our paramount concern is to give effect to the
legislative intent, manifested by the plain language of the statute. Unless a
statute is ambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain language of the
statute. In doing so, we "presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and [we] give effect to the term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning," and we "seek 4to render all parts [of the statute]
relevant and meaningful."'
State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75,1 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (alterations
in original) (citations omitted).
The trial court held that the objection period ended ninety days after the last
claimant received its copies of the proposed determination (R. 440,443), allowing water
users such as the Company more than ninety days to file objections (the Company had
626 days). The trial court erred, however, because the statute does not allow more than
ninety days for individual water users to file objections.
r7
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The plain language of section 73-4-11 allows each water user ninety days from the
date of service to file objections. Referring to section 73-4-11, this Court has stated, "By
the plain language of the statute, [the water user] had ninety days from the date of service
of the proposed determination to file an objection to the proposed award of water rights to
[the other water user]." United States Fuel Co, v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
2003 UT 49, f 17,79 P.3d 945.
Section 73-4-11 requires the State Engineer to mail (or serve) a copy of the
proposed determination on "each claimant" with notice that "any claimant" may file an
objection within ninety days. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). The words "each"
and "any" make the service and deadline specific to each claimant without reference to
others. See Black's Law Dictionary 266 (abridged 5th ed. 1983). The ninety day
objection period therefore ends for each claimant ninety days after that individual
claimant was served. The statute does not provide an objection period that is independent
of the date of service to the individual water user, or an objection period that ends ninety
days after a different water user is served. If the legislature had intended the objection
period to run for ninety days from the date the last water user in an area is served, it
would have so stated. Instead, the plain language of the statute provides a ninety day
objection period based on the date of service to each individual water user.
By the plain language of the statute, the Company had ninety days from the date it
was served with the proposed determination to file any objections. See United States
Fuel, 2003 UT 49, f 17. The trial court erred when it ruled that the objection period for
18
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the Company did not begin to run until Joseph Novak was served on June 4, 1974.

I AH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW PREVENTS LATE
OBJECTIONS FROM BEING LITIGATED IN THE GENERAL
ADJUDICATION
The present case fits into a line of Utah Supreme Court cases that addresses
whether water users can litigate issues that were settled by the proposed determination
and were not raised in a timely objection. The question in this case is whether failure to
file a timely objection bars a water user from litigating an issue settled by the proposed
determination < HI whether the water user can simply file a late objection to raise the issue
and litigate it within the general adjudication.
In United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 79
P.3d 945, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) must be read in
conjunction with section 73-4-12,3 which requires the trial court to enter a judgment in
accordance with the proposed determination for water rights that are uncontested at the
end of the statutory ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11. Utah Code Ann. §
73-4-12 (1989); United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, f 15. In United States Fuel, the
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co. (HCIC) and United States Fuel Co. (USF) both
claimed water rights from Cedar Creek in the Huntington Creek drainage. The HCIC

3

Section 73-4-12 states in relevant part, "If no contest on the part of any claimant
shall have been filed, the court shall render a judgment in accordance with such proposed
determination, which shall determine and establish the rights of the several claimants to
the use of the water of said river system or water source .. " Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12
(1989).
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water right had an earlier priority than the USF water rights. United States Fuel, 2003 UT
49, % 3. The water rights were published in the Proposed Determination of Water Rights
for the San Rafael River drainage. Id. USF's representative was served a proposed
determination and signed a receipt and consent form, id. at U 4, similar to the Notice,
Receipt and Waiver form signed by a representative of the Company in the present case,
see Notice, Receipt and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13). USFfiledan objection ninety-one
days later. United States Fuel 2003 UT 49, % 4. Several years later, USF filed an action
in district court seeking to quiet title to certain water rights and to determine the priorities
of the water rights. After a trial, the court found in favor of USF. Id. at % 8.
On appeal, this Court vacated the trial court decision, holding that section 73-4-12
requires the trial court to enter a decree on all water rights that were not contested when
the statutory ninety-day objection period expired. Id. at J 15. "The clear mandate of
section 73-4-12 is that courts must render judgment in accordance with a proposed
determination where the proposed determination is uncontested at the close of the ninetyday statutory period." Id. If the water user files a timely objection, the water user can
pursue the claim within the general adjudication or through an expedited proceeding
pursuant to section 73-4-24. Id. at ^ 18. Because the issues were settled by the proposed
determination, USF could not pursue its claims in a private action outside the general
adjudication. Id.; accord Hicken v. North Field Ditch Co., No. 960360-CA (Utah Ct.
App. Mar. 20, 1997) (unpublished memorandum decision), Addendum 8.
The same reasoning applies within the general adjudication. It would make no
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sense if a water user with a water right that was uncontested at the end of the statutory
objection period is entitled to "judgment in accordance with the proposed determination"
against another water user who seeks to attack the water right outside the adjudication,
but has no defense and no right to "judgment in accordance with the proposed
determination" against the same opposing water user who files a late objection and
pursues it within the general adjudication. If section 73-4-12 means that the trial court
must enter a judgment in accordance with the proposed determination for water rights that
are uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day objection period, it applies whether
the late attack comes as part of the general adjudication or collaterally.
In Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1994), this Court held that a water user
could not maintain an action pursuant to section 73-4-24 unless that action was based on a
timely objection. A section 24 adjudication action expedites the hearing of a valid
objection.4 Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 (1989); see United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, % 18;
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). It would make no
sense to bar a section 24 action for lack of a timely objection, but allow an non-expedited
action within the regular general adjudication proceedings based on the same late or
defective objection.
Earlier case law from this Court stated this long-standing principle: "[I]f the

Section 73-4-24 allows water users to litigate an issue between fewer than all the
parties. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 (1989). After the Proposed Determination is
published, section 73-4-24 allows water users to expedite hearing of a valid, timely
objection. Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994)).
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claimant makes no objection, he, by his silence, does in legal effect precisely what every
other person who is sued and makes default does, namely, confesses the statements
contained in the engineer's proposed determination of his water rights, and thus a
judgment may legally be entered in accordance with the proposed determination of the
engineer." Eden Irrigation Co. v. Dist. Court, 211 P. 957, 960 (Utah 1922). This Court
explained, "This is no more than entering a default judgment after a party by his silence
has confessed the allegation of the complaint." Id; United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, % 20
("When USF failed to timely contest HCIC's claim to the 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek water,
it took on the status of a defaulting party in the general adjudication."); Green River
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2 °03 UT 50,1} 29, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 ("[T]he State Engineer's
decisions in a general adjudication or pursuant to a proposed determination are binding
upon the parties unless and until a party files a timely objection to the proposed
determination."). The United States Fuel, Jensen, Green River Canal Co., and Eden
Irrigation Co. decisions hold water right owners responsible to file objections within the
statutory ninety-day period. If they do not, they take on the status of a defaulting party,
effectively consenting to a decree pursuant to section 73-4-12.
In United States Fuel, this Court alluded to the question of whether the trial court
in a general adjudication can allow litigation of an untimely objection. See United States
Fuel, 2003 UT 49,ffij18, 20 (the general adjudication is the proper forum for USF to
"seek relief for its untimely-filed objection"). However, the Court's statements directing
the parties to seek relief in the general adjudication do not imply that the trial court has
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discretion to modify or retroactively extend the objection period to more than ninety days.
Rather, this i >urt recognized that the trial court in the general adjudication was the
proper court to rule on the validity of the objection. If there is a question about whether
an objection is actually late, the water user can present its case to the general adjudication
trial court - for example, if the ninety days ended on a weekend or legal hohda
United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, fflj 17, 18, 20. However, if the objection is found to be
late, the effect of sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 must be the same whether the action is
pursued within or outside the general adjudication.
Jensen precludes a section 73-4-24 adjudication, which is an expedited hearing of
an objection within the adjudication, unless it is based on a timely objection, and United
States Fuel precludes a separate action outside the adjudication that is not based on a
timely objection. If a water user such as Mr. Jensen or USF who is blocked by these
cases only has to file a late objection in the general adjudication to circumvent those
rulings, then the discussions in both cases about lack of a timely objection and the
discussion in United States Fuel about section 73-4-12 are only dicta. Both cases would
simply designate the proper forum, and the reasoning supporting the decisions would be
incorrect. Such an outcome would render the ninety-day objection period in section 73-411 meaningless.

D.

SECTION 73-4-10 ALLOWS PROSPECTIVE BUT NOT
RETROACTIVE EXTENSIONS

When construing statutes, this Court has said that "statutory enactments are to be
23
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so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Millet v. Clark
Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); see also Hall v. Utah State Dep 't of
Corrections, 2001 UT 34, % 15, 24 P.3d 958. The Court strives to avoid "interpretations
that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall, 2001 UT 34, ^.15.
Section 73-4-10 allows the trial court to extend time for filing any "protest" upon a
showing of "due cause." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989).5 The Company relied on
section 73-4-10 in seeking a retroactive extension of time to cover its late objections. It
filed its motion for an extension in December 2000 in response to the State Engineer's
motion to dismiss all of the Company's objections. The trial court denied the motion for
extension under section 73-4-10 and made no findings of due cause as required by that
section. (R. 443-44).
The State Engineer does not dispute that the trial court has authority under proper
circumstances to extend the time for filing an objection under section 73-4-10 if the
motion is filed before the end of the ninety-day objection period. However, the trial court
does not have authority to grant an extension if the water user fails to file a motion for an
extension within ninety days from the date of service of the proposed determination.
Section 73-4-11 and the extension provision in section 73-4-10 must be read together to
give effect to both. The ninety-day limit in section 73-4-11 becomes superfluous and

5

Section 73-4-10 states: "The court shall have power to allow amendments to any
petition, statement, or pleading; to extend as provided in this title the time for filing any
statement of claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time forfilingany other
pleading, statement, report, or protest." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989).
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inoperative if trial courts can grant extensions retroactively.
This statutory scheme has parallels elsewhere in the Utah statutes. For example,
sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 of the Utah Code are analogous to sections 73-4-11 and
73-4-12. Section 63-30-12 states that a claim against the state "is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the attorney general and within one year after the claim arises." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2003). There is also an extension provision, section 6330-11, similar to the extension provision in section 73-4-10, that allows the trial court to
extend the time for filing the notice of claim, but does not specify whether retroactive
extensions are available. Id. § 63-30-11(4). Interpreting these statutes together, this
Court has held that the trial courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the case unless the
complaining party files the notice of claim before the one year deadline or the deadline as
prospectively extended. See Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (notice
of claim filed one day late resulted in dismissal); see also Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d
130, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Complying with the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit.. .
."); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep 't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(notice of claim provision is not a statute of limitation, but "is a jurisdictional requirement
and a precondition to suit"). These cases hold that retroactive extensions are unavailable
because the trial court loses jurisdiction at the expiration of the notice period. Section 6330-11 allows extensions when the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of
the one year deadline, but it does not permit retroactive extensions.
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Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also has an analogous
jurisdictional deadline. Rule 4 requires a party seeking to appeal a final order to file a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after entry of the
judgment. Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (2002). The trial court may grant an extension "upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause," but the motion for the extension must be
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the original 30-day period. Id. 4(e).
The rule thus establishes two deadlines. The first may be extended by motion filed either
before the first deadline or within 30 days after the first deadline. After the second 30 day
deadline, however, the trial court cannot grant a motion for an extension because lateness
is a jurisdictional defect. See Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1232-34 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (court had no jurisdiction to hear cross appeal because the notice of cross
appeal was not filed timely and the cross-appellant did not file a timely motion for an
extension).
Like section 63-30-12 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
section 73-4-11 is jurisdictional and establishes a firm deadline for filing objections to the
proposed determination. If the water user moves for an extension before the end of the
statutory ninety-day objection period, the trial court may grant the extension "upon due
cause shown." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). After the objection period expires,
however, the trial court may not grant an extension retroactively. Otherwise, the statutory
ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11 and the judgment provision in section 734-12 are superfluous and inoperative, only enforceable at the discretion of the trial court.
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E.

THE COMPANY'S EQUITABLE ARGUMENTS DO NOT JUSTIFY
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 73-4-11
OR SATISFY THE DUE CAUSE REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 734-10

The Company argued that the State Engineer's motion to dismiss was barred by the
equitable doctrines of laches and waiver. (R. 69-73). The Company also used its
arguments in support of laches and waiver as support for its argument that it met the due
cause standard in section 73-4-10. (R. 64). The trial court apparently considered the
Company's equitable arguments when it interpreted section 73-4-11. Memorandum
Decision at 4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 442-43).
The trial court erred in considering equitable arguments to interpret section 73-411. First, the plain language of the statute controls, and the trial court's interpretation is
contrary to the plain language of the statute, as discussed above. Second, any authority
the trial court might have to relieve a water user from strict compliance with the ninetyday objection period comes only from section 73-4-10, not from a generalized authority to
exercise discretion regarding the procedural aspects of the general adjudication. See Utah
Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989) ("In all such cases the court shall proceed to determine the
water rights involved in the manner provided by this chapter, and not otherwise."). The
trial court therefore erred by considering the Company's equitable arguments in its
interpretation of section 73-4-11, and the Company's arguments that the equitable
doctrines of laches and waiver bar the State Engineer's motion to dismiss fail for the
same reason.
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The Company's arguments that it met the due cause standard in section 73-4-11
also fail because the trial court has no discretion to allow retroactive extensions of the
ninety-day objection period. The trial court properly denied the motion for an extension
and made no finding regarding the "due cause" standard. However, even if the trial court
did have discretion to grant an extension retroactively under section 73-4-10, the
Company did not demonstrate "due cause" as the statute requires. The Company offered
no evidence or explanation of any circumstances to justify or excuse its late filing of the
1973 Objection or any of the other objections. It offered no explanation why it waited
until 2000, when the State Engineer filed the motion to dismiss, before it filed its motion
for extension. The Company's primary argument was that some evidence that might have
excused the late filing might have existed at some time, but the Company cannot now find
it. (R. 454: 102-103; 65-73; 187; 193-195). The Company conceded it was unable to
defend itself against the motion to dismiss, arguing instead that its inability to gather
evidence was because the State Engineer had delayed filing the motion to dismiss. (R.
64-7la). However, under any standard, the Company bore the burden of demonstrating
that it had due cause for filing the objections late. The Company also bears the
responsibility to protect its own interests through the course of the general adjudication,
including retaining evidence that might have excused the late filing, if such evidence
existed. At any time after filing the 1973 Objection, the Company could have sought
resolution of its objection by filing a petition pursuant to section 73-4-24. See United
States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 18, 79 P.3d 945;
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Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). The Company
chose not to do so, and it cannot now blame the State Engineer for the consequences.
Any delay was as much a product of the Company's own decisions as the State
Engineer's actions.
The Company also argued that the State Engineer responded differently to other
objections, and that the trial court should therefore overlook the lateness of the
Company's objections. (R. 71-71a, 229-30, 454: 86-91). There is, however, no
relationship between the State Engineer's response to other objections in 2000 and the
Company's late filing in 1973. The "due cause" standard must relate to the circumstances
of the filing of the 1973 Objection or the other objections, not unrelated events that
occurred much later.
In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court was concerned because water users
were served proposed determinations on different days some time apart. Memorandum
Decision at 2,4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 440, 442-43). The Company argued that water users
who receive copies of the proposed determination later have an advantage over those who
receive them earlier. (R. 454: 61,442). It argued that for this reason, the ninety-day
objection period should not begin to run until all claimants have received copies of the
proposed determination. Memorandum Decision at 2, Addendum 1 (R. 440). This
construction of section 73-4-11 infers into the statute a requirement that all water users
receive the proposed determination "almost contemporaneously." Id. at 4 (R. 442).
However, this Court has said that it is improper to infer terms into a statute, stating,
29
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"Indeed, we will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we have] no power to
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention that is not expressed.'" AGC v. Board of
Oil Gas and Mining, 2001 UT 112, % 30, 38 P.2d 291 (alterations in original) (quoting
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)). There is no statutory
requirement for contemporaneous service, and it was improper to infer that requirement
into the statute.
In any case, there is no advantage or disadvantage to receiving a proposed
determination earlier or later than another water user, because all water users affected by
an objection are allowed to participate in its resolution. See Plain City Irrigation Co. v.
Hooper Irrigation Co., 51 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1935). Water users can protect their
interests by participating in the resolution of the objection and do not need to file a
"counter-objection."
When all the company's arguments are considered carefully, they do not constitute
due cause. Neither the Company's speculation nor anything the State Engineer did or did
not do after the fact justifies the Company's failure to file its objections timely.

F.

THE LEGISLATURE HAD SOUND REASONS FOR THE
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL
ADJUDICATION

Sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 work together to give a degree of security and
stability to water rights during the time between publication of the proposed
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determination and entry of the final decree. Section 73-4-11 requires that objections must
be filed within ninety days from the date of service of the proposed determination on the
respective water user. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11; see United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49,
DTI 19, 20, 79 P.3d 945; Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f| 29, 31, 486
Utah Adv. Rep. 34; Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 1992). It also requires
the State Engineer to administer water rights "in accordance with the proposed
determination," or in accordance with an earlier decree for decreed water rights. Utah
Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). Section 73-4-12 reinforces the statutory ninety-day
objection period by requiring the trial court to enter a judgment in accordance with the
proposed determination for water rights that are uncontested at the end of the statutory
ninety-day objection period. See id. § 73-4-12; United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49,ffl[1820.
One purpose of the general adjudication is to "make a permanent record of existing
rights." Provo River Water Users s Ass yn v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 935 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted). This Court stated that "the basic goal of general adjudication i s to
record all water claims from a particular source which subsequent appropriators can rely
upon before making their investments.'" Id. (quoting Robert W. Swenson, A Primer of
Utah Water Law: Part II, 6 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 1, 29 (1985)). The final decree must
have a "degree of finality and solidarity," id. (quoting Green River Adjudication v. United
States, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (Utah 1965)), and "collateral attacks should be discouraged,"
id. (citing Swenson at 34).
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The same rationale applies to the finality of the statutory ninety-day objection
period. The decree for a particular area cannot be entered until all of the objections are
litigated to a final resolution. That may be many years, or even decades. During that
interim time, water rights that were uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day
objection period should not be subject to a constant threat, extending to the day a decree
is entered, that any water user could at any time file a late objection.
If the ninety-day objection period is respected, water users can rely on water rights
that are uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day objection period as having a
certain level of security. Water users can determine which objections have been filed and
which issues have been raised, knowing that water rights are safe from a direct attack by
other water users who did not file timely objections, and make decisions accordingly.
They would also know that other water users cannot file late objections to expand water
rights that compete for the same water. Water users and lenders can feel confident about
investments based on the water rights. Buyers and sellers can inform themselves about
the strengths and weaknesses of water rights and act accordingly.
This stability, based on a hierarchy of water rights by priority, extends throughout
the stream system. The State Engineer can administer the water rights for the entire
system as required by section 73-4-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) (State
Engineer shall administer water rights in accordance with the proposed determination
until the decree is entered). Water users and the State Engineer can rely on the priorities,
amounts, diversion points, and other characteristics of the water rights, as established in
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the proposed determination, when considering change applications and other transactions.
In contrast, an open-ended objection period, or one that could be retroactively
extended at any time, would mean that no individual water rights and no collective
systems of water rights would be secure from a direct attack by another water user. They
could also be subject to an indirect attack in which competing water rights are enlarged at
the expense of others on the system. An open-ended objection period would inevitably
change the way water rights are regarded and administered in Utah.
If the trial court can extend or re-define the statutory ninety-day objection period, it
disrupts the statutory scheme established by the legislature. The notice required by
section 73-4-11 "that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from
such day of mailing file . . . a written objection," Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989),
would be untrue on its face. An open-ended objection period would cause an already
long process to become interminable, because litigation of a single late objection could
extend the adjudication many years, and another would extend it for years more.
The Memorandum Decision creates a problem that is particularly acute. No one
can predict at the outset when the last person in an area will be served. No one would
know in advance when the objections are actually due if the trial court has discretion to
set the due date retroactively from far in the future. The State Engineer and other water
users would never know which objections are late because the trial court could at any
time extend the objection period to allow any or all late objections.
It is unfortunate that general adjudications take so long. However, the legislature
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has established a statutory framework that provides security for water users during the
time the adjudication is proceeding. The statutory ninety-day objection period is a crucial
part of that framework, and this Court should uphold it by not allowing late objections or
retroactive extensions of the objection period.
II.

SECTION 73-4-11 DOES NOT ALLOW LATE OBJECTIONS TO BE
CONSIDERED AMENDMENTS OR SUPPLEMENTS OF A TIMELY
OBJECTION UNLESS THEY ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE
TIMELY OBJECTION
If the 1973 Objection is found to be timely, this case raises the question of when a

late objection is a supplement to a timely objection, and when it is actually a new
objection barred by the ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11. It requires the
Court to examine the substance of objections rather than labels.
A major reason for the statutory time limit for filing objections is so water users *
have notice of issues that affect their water rights. "Supplemental" or "amended"
objections that raise new issues subvert this purpose in the same way and for the same
reasons as late objections in general, and they cause the same problems for water rights
and for the general adjudication. Sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 bar new issues raised
after the ninety-day objection period, whether those issues are raised in a late objection or
a late objection masquerading as a "supplement" or "amendment" to a timely objection.
Otherwise, a cunning water user - and they are out there - could simply file an empty
objection titled "objection" and fill it with issues as the years roll by.
Section 73-4-10 gives the trial court "power to allow amendments to any petition,
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statement, or pleading." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). The list of amendable
filings, however, does not include "objection" or "protest." Id. At most, the statutes
allow water users to supplement timely objections by offering additional supporting
evidence.
In this case, even if the 1973 Objection were timely, the trial court erred when it
allowed the Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection to relate back in time to the
original 1973 Objection. The Second 1993 Objection (disputing the Green River City
water right), Addendum 6, and the 1999 Objection (claiming the flow right should be
increased by 20 c.f.s. to a total of 80 c.f.s.), Addendum 7, are completely unrelated to the
1973 Objection (requesting an irrigation duty of five acre feet per acre rather than four),
Addendum 4. While the First 1993 Objection (requesting an irrigation duty of six acrefeet per acre), Addendum 5, expanded on the issue raised by the 1973 Objection, the
Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection raised new issues completely unrelated to
the 1973 Objection. The trial court accepted the later objections as "merely amendments
and/or specifications to the original filing." Memorandum Decision at 5, Addendum 1
(R. 443). However, the 1973 Objection gives no hint of notice of the issues raised in the
Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection. They raise no common issues of fact,
law, or evidence.
The unlimited "amendment" of objections, including the raising of new and
unrelated issues, only circumvents the ninety-day deadline in section 73-4-11. The best
policy for the vast majority of water users and for the health and progress of the general
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adjudication is that only issues that are raised in a valid, timely objection may be pursued
in the general adjudication.
CONCLUSION
The ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11 is a critical part of the statutory
adjudication process. It allows water users to contest the State Engineer's
recommendations to the court as to how water rights in an area should be recognized. It
also places a burden of responsibility on the water users to file within ninety days. The
statutes and case law require that each recipient of a proposed determination have ninety
days to object to it, and water users should not be allowed to circumvent the effects of the
statute by belatedly asking for an extension or creatively labeling a late objection an
amendment.
This Court should reverse the trial court decision as a matter of law, and direct the
trial court to dismiss the Company's objections.
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Dated this 20th day of January, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

NORMAN K. JOHNSON,(No. 3816
L. WARD WAGSTAFF, No. 5554
JULIE I. VALDES, No. 8545
Assistant Attorneys General
ATTORNEYS FOR UTAH STATE ENGINEER
1594 West North Temple, # 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
State Engineer's Address:
Jerry D. Olds
Utah State Engineer
P.O. Box 146300
1594 West North Temple, # 220
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6300
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT were mailed by United States Mail first class postage prepaid, this 20th
day of January, 2004, to the following:

J. Craig Smith
Scott M. Ellsworth
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC
215 South State Street # 650
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company
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Addendum 1:

Memorandum Decision on Utah State Engineer's Motion
to Dismiss and Claimant, Green River Canal Company's,
Motion to Dismiss and/or Extend Time for Filing
Objections
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO USE
OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND
UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE
DRAINAGE AREA OF GREEN RIVER
FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE
GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS,
EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF
THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON UTAH
STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND CLAIMANT, GREEN
RIVER CANAL COMPANY'S, MOTION
TO DISMISS AND/OR EXTEND TIME
FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Case No. 690708598

AREA 91, BOOK 5
Plaintiff,
The Court heard oral arguments on the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss the Green River
Canal Company's Objections to its Proposed Determination, and Canal Company's Motion in
Opposition to the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss and included Motion to Either Extend the
Deadlines or in the alternative to Dismiss the General Adjudication Complaint herein. Post hearing
supplemental briefs were also filed and considered.
Both parties request relief which requires the Court to construe parts or all of two Utah
statutes, to wit: §73-4-3 UCA which provides in pertinent part as follows:
" . . . and as soon as this survey has been completed, the state engineer shall file notice of
completion with the clerk and give notice by registered mail or bv personal service to all
claimants whose names appear on the list that the survey has been completed",
and §73-4-11 UCA which provides, again in pertinent part:
"... After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the surveys, records, and files,
and after a personal examination of the river system or water source involved, if such
examination is deemed necessary, the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed
determination of all rights to the use of the water of such river system or water source, and
a copy of the same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any
claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the
clerk of the district court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state engineer
shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural sources in accordance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with the proposed determination or modification thereof by Court order until afinaldecree
is rendered by the Court; provided, if the right to the use of said waters has been theretofore
decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be distributed in accordance with such decree until
the same is reversed, modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside". (EMPHASIS MINE)
The State Engineer claims that Canal Company did not comply with the 90 day limit in §73-411 and further, relies on the language of §73-4-3, which allows any notice required therein to be
served by registered mail or personal service, to validate his claimed service of Canal Company under
73-4-11 essentially contending that the alleged acceptance by Delbert Tidwell as evidenced in Exhibit
A to State Engineers Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Dismiss, waives the mailing requirements
of 73-4-11. Contrarily, Canal Company requests this Court strictly construe 73-4-11 and require that
all claimants receive notice by mail contending that until all claimants receive the necessary notice the
90 days should not begin to run since to do otherwise places claimants who last receive their notices
in an unequal position to those whofirstreceive their notices, which they contend this Court should
not approve. I agree with this construction.
The facts are not in dispute.
1.

The State Engineer did not mail by regular mail to the Green River Canal Company
a Notice of Proposed Determination. He claims that the Notice, Receipt, and Waiver
signed by Tidwell (an alleged agent of this company) vitiates this failure and begins
the running of the 90 day objection period from the alleged date of the Notice, to wit,
December 15, 1972.

2.

The Canal Company did not file an objection with the Court or otherwise in the 90
day period, as that is computed by the State Engineer in his argument, but did file
"protests" allegedly on June 8, 1973, (Canal Company's contention, see chronology
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of events) or June 20, 1973, (See State Engineer's Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Dismiss hereafter MEMO); June 18, 1993 (two separate "objections,
MEMO; and on October 14, 1999, (MEMO, page 3).
The Court's understanding and therefore findings are:
1.

The determinations which directly affect the Green River Canal Company herein were
contained in volumes 5 and 6 of area #91 of the State Engineer's Proposed
Determination.

2.

All of the Certificates of Mailing onfileherein referring to Area #91 include Volumes
5 and/or 6 and extend from October 24, 1973 to January 10, 1974. .

3.

Some "claimants" are not listed in any mailing certificate but only may be discovered
by reviewing the various bound volumes of receipt and waivers, again for the various
volumes and/or areas.

4.

The signed Waivers upon which the State Engineer's Office relies, date from late
1972 to June 4, 1974 as to Area 91, and early 1979 until August 27, 1979, with
regards to Area 92.

5.

Neither party was able to explain to my satisfaction either why the State Engineer
representative accepted Waivers and/or published Notices over the periods alleged or
why thefirstCanal Company's protest was notfiledwithin the 90 days as computed
by the State Engineer. However, both parties rely on the long periods of time which
have expired as suggesting that reasonable alternatives might exist.

Both parties request the Court construe the statutes strictly as against the opposing party, but
not as against them.
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The Court believes that no benefit is to be anticipated from the Court granting Green River
Canal Company's motion to extend the time to the present for filing protests, objections, and claims
nor the alternative motion to dismiss the general determination adjudication from going forward.
However, the Court believes that in equity as well as according to the law, I can construe the statutes
to do the least harm possible and by so doing I serve the equitable position that all parties deserve
their legitimate day in Court, but do not extend and compound the complications alluded to by the
State Engineer in his arguments which the Court believes are inherent in closing and thereafter reopening the general determination proceedings. I therefore deny Green River Canal Company's
Motion to Dismiss and also their Motion to Extend Time for filing protests, except has hereafter
stated.
The Court concludes that the Legislative Scheme was and is purposeful - and the Legislature
had a reason(s) for drafting the disparate language in the two sections. Clearly, if one objector must
disclose his objections and they involve another claimants water right, and that other claimant,
because he has consciously delayed or not picked up or been mailed the Notice, then the latter has
the advantage of reviewing the earlier objections - the later objector may have information not
available to the earlier objector which may be either beneficial or detrimental to the earlier objector.
The Court believes such concerns underscore the Legislature's determination that the Notice be
mailed to each claimant under §73-4-11 UC A. Such a mailing I believe, would also allow the Notices
to be received by the claimants/objectors almost contemporaneously, which I believe the legislative
scheme anticipated.
If all objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all claimants should have 90 days to
present their objections under 73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed using the date
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is onfileherein which affects each area.
With regard to area #91,1 conclude that to be June 4,1974, which is the date of the last dated Waiver
by Joseph Novak. With regard to Area #92, it may be as late as August 27, 1979, the date of Waiver
of Odell P. Anderson and B.E. Larson using a similar formula for Area 91, but I am not called upon
to decide that herein. The State Engineer Office's decision to not strictly comply with the statutory
language does, I believe, allow me legal latitude for this interpretation and I believe equitably
speaking, the delay in raising the defense which the State Engineer's Office now attempts to raise by
its' Motion to Dismiss gives me equitable grounds for allowing the proceedings to go forward and
to treat the Green River Canal's objection as being timely filed and further treating the "supplemental
filings" by that company as merely amendments and/or specifications to the original filing which I am
holding was timely filed, that is, before 90 days after June 4, 1974, either June 8th or 20th, 1973.
The action which the Court takes, I believe confirms the statutory requirements of §73-4-11,
and yet allows the state engineer to distribute the waters pursuant to the proposed determination until
a Decree is entered, and will allow both parties to raise the question as to the legitimate amount of
waters attributable to the Green River Canal Company herein. I realize that this construction or
interpretation may create some additional problems, but I believe it legally and equitably addresses
the issues and provides a workable procedure which complies with the Legislative language going
forward. I believe this interpretation should have only prospective application to the various factual
circumstances that the State Engineer must accommodate.
For all of the foregoing reasons the Court denies the State Engineer's Motion of Dismissal
as well as the Motions to Dismiss made by the Canal Company and denies the Canal Company's
request for additional time to file claims except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statutory scheme allows additional time to file the objection herein.
Although not before me at this time, it would appear equitable to limit any claim for water by
the Canal Company to the amount contained in the original statement of water users claim filed
November 6,1969. If the subsequent objection/amendments to objection increase that amount, to the
extent that those amounts are increased after the 90 day statutory period, which with regard to area
91 this Court concludes should be computed from June 4,1974, this Court should be disinclined to
allow any such broadening of the claim

J7£day ofJanuaiy, 2003

Dated this 7
/

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a signed copy ofthe foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR EXTEND TIME FOR
FILING OBJECTIONS on the - " T ^ a y of February, 2003, to the following:
Steven A. Wuthrich
Counsel for Lee Thayn
1011 Washington, Suite #102
Montpelier, ID 83254

\L.

Ward Wagstaff, Esq., Julie I. Valdes, Mark Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General, Counsel for State Engineer
1594 W. North Temple, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn, & Peters
Counsel for Green River City
185 S. State, Suite #7000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

v

jyMtM/

—^Clerk^Deputy Court Clerk
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Addendum 2:

Notice, Receipt and Waiver (Green River Canal
Company)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE
AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS
TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND
COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE
AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH.

NOTICE
RECEIPT AND WAIVER

To all users of water within the above-described drainage area:
There is hereto attached and herewith served upon you a copy of
the Proposed Determination of Water Rights for Price River and Lower
Green River Drainage, as prepared by the State Engineer in the aboveentitled cause. This Proposed Determination will be on file at all times
with the Clerk of this court in Price, Utah, and copies thereof may be
obtained from the office of the Division of Water Rights at Salt Lake
City, Utah, upon payment of the actual cost of the printing thereof; and
you are notified that any claimant dissatisfied with said Proposed Determination must file with the Clerk of the above-entitled court a written
objection thereto duly verified on oath within ninety (90) days from and
after the date of service of this notice upon you.
Dated this

^&&>

day of

JU(L^

_, 19 7Z<
Hubert C. Lambert
State Engineer
442 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Dallin W. Jensen
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State Engineer

The undersigned, being a water claimant within the above-described
drainage area and a party to this proceeding, hereby acknowledges receipt
of the Proposed Determination of Water Rights for Price River and Lower
Green River Drainage as prepared by the Division of Water Rights of the
State of Utah.
Price River Div., Book 1

) (

Price River Div., Book 5

Price River Div., Book 2

j(

Price River Div., Book 6

Price River Div., Book 3

Lower Green River Division

Price River Div., Book 4

And the undersigned waives any further service in connection therewith
and consents to the entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal
protest is made by the undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court
within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof.

Dated this /fjTjjg; day of

&w

obu^

v>Z2*

fa^c«~*J>r*.
CLAIMANT

> c-.
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Addendum 3:

Water User's Claim 92-294 (Proposed Determination of
Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River
Drainage, Area Code No. 91 Book 5, p. 1143)
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W.U.C. NO. 294

NAME: Greenriver Canal Company

MAP:

144d

SOURCE:

Green River (Gravity Canal)

FLOW: (See Period of Use)

TYPE OF RIGHT:

Diligence Claim No. 46

PRIORITY:

1880

POINT OF DIVERSION: N. 1950 ft. and W. 800 ft. from the SE corner. Sec. 17, T20S, R16E, SLBM.
PERIOD OF USE:

Irrigation:
April 1 to October 31:
Stockwatering &
Domestic:
November 1 to March 31:

PURPOSE, EXTENT & PLACE OF USE:

60.0 cfs*
20.0 cfs

Irrigation:

9.20 acs. SEy4NEy4, 1.7 acs. NE'^SE 1 ^ Sec. 20, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 7.70 acs. NEVMEV*. 9.00 acs. SEy-NE'A, 6.60 acs.
SWASEV*, 0.20 ac. NE1/4SE1/4, 24.30 acs. NWy4SE1/4, 0.70 ac. NE'/iSWtt, 27.40 acs. SW%SE%, 23.30 acs. SEy4SW%, Sec.
29, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 23.00 acs. SEy4NEy4, 28.40 acs. NE1/4SEy4, 1.10 acs. SEy«SE1/4, Sec. 31, T20S, R16E, SLBM;
4.7 acs. NW'/iNE1/-, 36.00 acs. NEy4NW1/4, 9.30 acs. NWKNWK, 17.70 acs. SE1/4NW1/4, 35.70 acs. S WKNWK, 7.20 acs.
NWy4SWy4, Sec. 32, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 15.20 acs. Lot 1, 32.50 acs. Lot 2, 45.50 acs. Lot 3, 8.50 acs. Lot 4, 4.60 acs.
Lot 9, 28.70 acs. Lot 10, 11.80 acs. Lot 11, Sec. 3, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 0.20 ac. Lot 1, 4.20 acs. Lot 16, 20.00 acs.
Lot 20 (NE%SE%) 0.70 ac. NWASEV*, 36.00 acs. SE1/«SE1/4, 31.80 acs. SWy4SE1/4, 4.10 acs. SE^SW1/*, Sec. 4, T21S,
R16E, SLBM; 36.00 acs. NE1/4NE1/4, 33.80 acs. NWftiNE'/i, 16.00 acs. NEVMWA, 37.70 acs. SEy4NEy4, 37.50 acs.
SVnNE'^, 1.10 acs. SEy4NW1/4, 9.70 acs. NWKSEK, 33.50 acs. NWKSEK, 1.70 acs. NE%SW%, 2.80 acs. SE1/4SE1/4,
27.80 acs. SWKSEK, 9.20 acs. SEKSWK, Sec. 9, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 20.00 acs. NWKNEK, 31.60 acs. NEXNWK,
39.00 acs. NWXNWX, 33.20 acs SW%NE!4 , 38.60 acs. SEKNWK, 36.20 acs. SW%NW%, 22.70 acs. NWKSEK, 40.00
acs. NEKSWK, 38.70 acs. NWXSWK. 5.40 acs. SW1/4SE1/4, 34.30 acs. SEXSWK, 25.70 acs. SW'ASW1/*, Sec. 10,
T21S, R16E, SLBM; 20.70 acs. NE%NW%, 37.60 acs. NW%NW%.0.40 ac. SE%NW%, 5.70 acs. SW14NWK. 8. 50
acs. NW%SW%, 5.20 acs. SW%SW!4, Sec. 15, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 13.90 acs. NE%NE%, 29.50 acs. NWKNEK,
4.40 acs. NEVMWA, 29.40 acs. SE%NE%, 16.20 acs. SW%NE%, 22.50 acs. NEUSEK, 28.50 acs. NWKSEK, 2.00
acs. NE%SW%, Sec. 16, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 35.50 acs. SEKSEX, 26.20 acs. SW%SE1/4, 0.20 acs. SE%SW%, Sec.
16, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 23.00 acs. NE'ANE1/*, Sec. 21, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 3.50 acs. NW%NW%, 1.40 acs. SW%NW%,
Sec. 22, T21S, R16E, SLBM, or a total acreage of 1,443.50 acres.
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED:
Annual water allowed 5774.00 acre-feet.

294

Stockwatering:
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED:
Annual water allowed 75.60 acre-feet.

294

Domestic:
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED:
Annual water allowed 54.60 acre-feet.

2000 cattle, 3000 sheep, 100 horses

75 families

294

*From April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and domestic is part of flow for irrigation.
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1973 Objection, Green River Canal Company
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Green River Canal Company
% Delbert Tidwell, Secretary
Green River, Utah 84525
B. H. Young
Carbon County Clerk
Carbon County Courthouse
Price, Utah 84501
RE:

Protest to Proposed
Deterrtinrtti^^
of Water Rights in the Price River &
Lower Green River Drainage - Civil 8598

Dear Mr. Young:

The Green River Canal Company hereby protests the "Proposed Determination of
Water Rights in the Price River & Lower Green River Drainage" as submitted by the
State Engineer to the Seventh Judicial District Court, for the following reasons:
1. The irrigation period of use is stated to be from April 1 to
October 31. In the Green River area the period of use is generally at least 30 days longer than the period of use in the
Price area. The period of use in the Green River area should
be at least March 15 to November 15.
2. Because of the longer growing season and because the temperatures in the Green River area are higher*than the temperatures
in the Price area, the consumptive use in the Green River area
is higher than the consumptive use in the Price area. Because
of the higher consumptive use in the Green River area the duty
in the Green River area should be at least 5 ac.-ft./ac./yr.,
measured at the farm headgate.
Sincerely yp^rs,
ts

Green River Canal Company
John Vetere, President
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS

COUNTY OF fc 1 * ^ f )
On the

My ° f j ^ / *"

me,
foregtfffuj instrument, who duly

rf

, personally appeared before
, the signer of the
dged to me that he executed the same.
NOTAfcY PUBLIC

(SEAL)
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: &Q (J

j H

ff*?^

cc: Division of Water Rights
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Addendum 5:

First 1993 Objection, Green River Canal Company

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JUH 18 93
Cci/rij

^ V E ^ p S p j C T COURT
Si Ale OFUTAH
UTAH

Michael R. Jensen #1685
FRANDSEN, KELLER, & JENSEN
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company
90 West 100 North
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone 801-637-1245
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER
IN UTAH

PROTEST BY GREEN
RIVER CANAL COMPANY
TO PROPOSED
DETERMINATION OF
WATER RIGHTS
Code No, 91 and 92
Civil No. 8598

Green River

Canal Company hereby makes the following protest of

the above referenced Proposed

Determination of

Water Rights

by the

State Engineer:
1.

In

the

Proposed

paragraph 5,

the

State

irrigation,

the

Determination

Engineer

diversion

of Water Rights, page ii,

concludes:

requirements

"In

the

instance of

have been considered to be

4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year,

regardless of

the source

of supply."
2.

All

of

the

irrigation

Proposed Determination of Water

water

rights

Rights have

represented in the

been given

a diversion

duty of 4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year, using alfalfa as a
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standard,

i n c l u d i n g Green R i v e r Canal Company's w a t e r r i g h t u n d e r 9 1 -

294.
3.

The 4 . 0 0

Green R i v e r a r e a /
from Anthony
Service,

diversion duty i s i n s u f f i c i e n t

a s e v i d e n c e d by

Beals/ Soil

a letter

Conservationist

dated February
for

the S o i l

t o Ted E k k e r ; P r e s i d e n t of t h e Green R i v e r C a n a l

A copy of s a i d
reference
4.

letter

made a p a r t
Diversion

R i v e r arear
91-294/

acre feet

is

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit

19/

the
1993

Conservation
Company.
A,

and by

hereof.
duty

for

irrigation

i n c l u d i n g Green R i v e r C a n a l

water r i g h t s

in t h e

Green

Company's w a t e r

right

under

s h o u l d be s e t a t 6 . 0 0 a c r e f e e t p e r a c r e p e r c a l e n d a r

DATED t h i s

for

year.

day of J u n e , 1 9 9 3 .
FRANDSEN, KELLER &^JENSEN

wr/i/c

^^

M i c h a e l R. J e n s e n
A t t o r n e y s f o r Gryeefa R i v e r C a n a l
Green R i v e r C a n a l Company
P . O . Box 211
Green River, Utah 84525
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Company

S T A T E OF U T A H

)
: ss
)

C O U N T Y OF CARBON

Ted E k k e r , being

first d u l y sworn

on oath/

d e p o s e s and

says:

That he
is the
P r e s i d e n t of G r e e n River Canal C o m p a n y ; that he
has read the foregoing instrument and k n o w s the c o n t e n t s thereof/ and
that the same is true and c o r r e c t to the best of his k n o w l e d g e e x c e p t
a s to m a t t e r s therein stated upon i n f o r m a t i o n and
belief/ and
a s to
such m a t t e r s b e l i e v e s them to be t r u e .

Subscribed

and

sworn

to before

me

this

/#

day of June/

NOTARY PUBLIC-"
LI
Residing a £0

1993.

y-s

My Commission E^ices^S A?%, *\

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

certify

that

Protest by Green River Canal
Water Rights

this

/ ^

I

personally

Company

to

day of^

a copy of the foregoing

Proposed

Determination of

-? 1993 to: Mark P. Page,

Regional Engineer for State Engineer, 453

South Carbon

Avenue, P.O.

Box 718, Price, Utah 84501-0718-

ytM

Michael R. J e n s e n
A t t o r n e y f o r Green Bfiver Canal Company
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jf^/iib/6

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE

SOIL
CONSERVATION
SERVICE

350 NORTH 400 EAST
PRICE, UTAH 34501
\
February 19, 1993

Dear Mr. Ekker:

You asked far information regarding consumptive use in the
Green River area so that you could respond to a letter from
the State Engineers office regarding adjudication of water
rights. The letter stated that alfalfa was used as the
reference crop and a figure of Z acft/ac was necessary for
growing alfalfa in most places in the state. The letter
further stated that an irrigation efficiency of 50% was
assumed and so 4 acft/ac was a standard allocation.

In the Green River area our data shows that 3.4 acft/ac is
needed to grow alfalfa. Taking out effective precipitation
reduces this amount to 3 acft/ac. Assuming 50% irrigation
efficiency, an allocation 6 acft/ac would be necessary for
growing alfalfa.

Sincerely,

Anthony D. Beals
So iI Conservat i on i st
P.S. I have enclosed information on financial
from Utah State Board of Water Resources.

assistance

cc Mark Page
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Addendum 6:

Second 1993 Objection, Green River Canal Company
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Michael R. Jensen #1685
FRANDSEN, KELLER, & JENSEN
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company
90 West 100 North
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone 801-637-1245
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER
IN UTAH

PROTEST BY GREEN
RIVER CANAL COMPANY
TO PROPOSED
DETERMINATION OF
WATER RIGHTS
Code No. 91 and 92
Civil No. 8598

Green River

Canal Company hereby makes the following protest of

the above referenced Proposed

Determination of

Water Rights

by the

State Engineer:
1.

Green River

Canal Company, under Water Right 91-294, holds

the earliest priority (year 1890) water right on the West side of the
Green River at the following point of diversion:
North 1950 feet and West 800 feet from the Southeast Corner
of Section 17, Township 20 South, Range 16 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
2.

Green River

City, under

220 second feet of water for

Water Right 91-39, makes claim to

power generation

purposes at

Ipoint of diversion described above.
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the same

3.

Green R i v e r C i t y ' s

be d e c l a r e d
water

to

applied

invalid,

because

beneficial
for

since

DATED t h i s

use;

the
fa

c l a i m and w a t e r r i g h t
Green R i v e r C i t y

and h a s n ' t

1920s or

- day o f

used

under 9 1 - 3 9

has f a i l e d

should

to apply

the w a t e r r i g h t

for

the

the
use

1930s,

June,

1993.

FRAUJDSEN, KELLER & >J£NSEN

M i c h a e l R. J e
A t t o r n e y s fo

Canal

Company

G r e e n R i v e r C a n a l Company
P . O . Box 211
Green R i v e r , Utah 84525

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CARBON

)
:ss
)

Ted Ekker, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That he is the President of Green River Canal Company; that he
has read the foregoing instrument and knows the contents thereof, and
that the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge except
as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to
such matters believes them to be true.
&&.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /£

day of June, 1993.

NOTARY PUBLIC/

EN,

&
N

v

My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s -

'-=••>/.•*

?*tjrj-\

Residing mt^Les

»£•&*

***£*&
"&*,
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that
Protest

by

Green

River

I

personally

a

copy

of

the foregoing

Canal Company to Proposed Determination of

Water Rights this
lis

a
f
1
f(]f_~
0'— dday
><p/yi^
/sjp?
y oof
^-

Regional Engineer

for S t a t e

, 1993

to: Mark

P. Page,

E n g i n e e r , 453 South Carbon Avenue, P.O.

Box 718, P r i c e , Utah 8 4 5 0 1 - 0 7 1 8 .

w^^^\^

lichael R. Jensen
Attorney for Gre

ver Canal Company

3
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Addendum 7:

1999 Objection, Green River Canal Company
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J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Protestant

U„

u
SL-VENT* DISTRICT

C^U^T/CARBON

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN
UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL PROTEST BY
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY TO
THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION
OF WATER RIGHTS
CodeNos. 91 and 92
Civil No. 8598

Green River Canal Company ("Canal Company"), by and through its counsel, J. Craig Smith
and David B. Hartvigsen of Nielsen & Senior, hereby supplements its earlier protests against the
Proposed Determination of Water Rights filed by the State Engineer in the above referenced matter.
The Canal Company objects to the Proposed Determination's recommendation concerning the Canal
Company's Water User Claim No. 91-294 on page 1143 of the Proposed Determination, wherein
it incorrectly assumes in a footnote that the claim for 60 cfs of irrigation water during the irrigation
season is inclusive of the Canal Company's claim for 20 cfs for stockwater on a year-round basis.
In support of this objection, the Canal Company offers the following:
1.

The Canal Company's Statement of Water User's Claim filed in this action on or

about November 6,1969 contains nothing that would suggest that the stockwater claim is included
within the irrigation claim during the irrigation season. In fact, the opposite is true. The Water
User's Claim includes a claim for year-round domestic water and lists its quantity as "inc."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

•

(included), clearly indicating that it was part of the 20 cfs of water for stockwatering. No such "inc."
language is used with respect to either the stockwatering during the irrigation season. The Canal
Company's Diligence Claim filed on June 18,1952, upon which its Water User Claim in this action
is based, similarly asserts arightto 20 cfs for stockwatering on a year-round basis and an additional
60 cfs for irrigation during the irrigation season.
2.

This canal is rather unique in its characteristics and operation requirements due to the

high sediment loads and siltation problems associated with diverting water from the Green River,
the veryflatterrain traversed by the canal, and the elevations of the individual diversions from the
canal. It must operate at full capacity, i.e., at 80 cfs as it has for the past century, in order to function
properly. It has never operated at 60 cfs during the irrigation season and could not do so.
Difficulties in delivering water to individual shareholders are encountered whenever it gets below
80 cfs, as verified by measurements conducted by both Jack Barnett, P.E., and Mike ReMillard this
past summer. Although much of the 80 cfs is not used for irrigation or stockwatering, it is required
as carrier water to deliver the irrigation and stock water to the high diversion points on the canal
system and to carry away the large sediment loads. This carrier water is all returned to the Green
River via numerous sluice gates along the length of the canal and at the tail end of the canal. The
20 cfs diverted during the off season is similarly required to deliver a fraction thereof for
stockwatering purposes in the non-irrigation season to a portion of the Canal Company's
shareholders.
3.

The Green River Canal Company is presently involved in litigation with the only

other party who uses the same point of diversion from the Green River as the Canal Company over
that party's claimed right to use the Canal Company's point of diversion and diversion facilities.
See Green River Canal Company v. Lee Thayn, Civil No. 95-070-6174, Seventh Judicial District
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court, the Honorable Bryce Bryner presiding. The Court has directly addressed the relative quantity
and priority issues of the parties and has issued an order on March 13,1999, establishing the Canal
Company's rights under this water right, i.e., Water Right No./Water User's Claim No. 91-294, to
be 80 cfs during the irrigation season and that said water right is the senior right at these diversion
facilities on the Green River. A copy of that order is attached hereto.
For these reasons, the Canal Company objects to the footnote on page 1143 in the Proposed
Determination that assumes that 20 cfs of stockwatering water is included within the Canal
Company's claim for 60 cfs during the irrigation season, which would effectively reduce the Canal
Company's diversion rights during the irrigation seasonfrom80 cfs to 60 cfs total and would render
the canal system incapable of delivering irrigation water to all of its shareholders which it has
historically been able to do. Therefore, the Proposed Determination should be amended as to Water
User Claim No. 91-294 by eliminating the note at the end thereof on page 1143 so as to restore the
Canal Company's total diversion right to 80 cfs during the irrigation season and 20 cfs during the
remainder of the year.
DATED this 13th day of October, 1999.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

J. Craig Smith
David B. Hartvigsen
Protestant's Address:
Green River Canal Company
c/o Tim Vetere, President
P. O. Box 404
Green River, Utah 84525

98582.GR255.001
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o<
J. Craig Smith, USB No. 4143
David B. Hartvigsen, USB No. 5390
Daniel J. McDonald, USB No. 7935
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah
Mutual Water Company,
Plaintiff,

LEE THAYN,
Defendant,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS EIGHTH AND
NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM
INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF'S
PRIOR RIGHT TO USE OF WATER
AND STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT
OF LEON THAYN
Civil No. 6174
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The Court having reviewed and considered the Memoranda, Exhibits and Affidavits filed for
and in opposition to Plaintiff Green River Canal Company's ("Green River") Motion for Summary
Judgment on its Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action, and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leon
Thayn, and having considered the arguments of J. Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, who appeared"
and argued the motions on behalf of Green River Canal Company, and the arguments of Reed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Martineau of Snow, Christensen and Martineau, who appeared and argued against the motions on
behalf of Defendant Lee Thayn ("Thayn") at the hearing conducted on February 26,1999, the Court
does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:
8*-

L

Green River's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on its Eighth and Ninth

Causes of Action.
2.

Green River holdsfirstpriority to divert and place into its canal thefirsteighty (80)

cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and
diversion facilities of Green River during the inigation season, March 1st through November 15th
of each year.
3.

Green River holdsfirstpriority to divert and place into its canal the first twenty (20)

cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and
diversion facilities of Green River during the non-inigation season, November 16th through
February 28 of each year,

. . . .

Therightof Thayn to divert and take water is subsequent and junior to Green River's
right to the eighty (80) cubic feet per second during the inigation season and twenty (20) cubic feet
per second during the balance of the year as set forth herein.
5.

In the event that Green River is not receiving its entire waterrightas set forth herein,

Thayn shall not divert or take any water,
6.

Thayn is permanently enjoined from encroaching upon or interfering with Green

River'srightto divert eighty (80) cubic feet per second of water into its canal during the irrigation
season, and twenty (20) cubic feet per second during the balance of the year.

061S.GJU55.001
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7.

The priority of the diversion of water and the quantity of Green River's right are

enforceable by the powers of this Court to enforce injunctions issued by this Court.
8.

The Affidavit of Leon Thayn submitted in opposition to Summary Judgment is

stricken as hearsay, and as attempting to controvert facts previously admitted by Thayn.
DATED this {jfe£. day of March, 1999.
BY THE COURT

}

^C/OL

HonoraWe Bryce K. bryner
EKstriCTCourt Judge

90618.GR255.001
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Addendum 8:

Hicken v. North Field Ditch Company, No. 960360-CA
(Utah Ct. App. Mar. 20,1997) (unpublished memorandum
decision)
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FILED
MAR 2 0 mi
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Ruby W. Hicken, Thomas F.
Hicken, and John T. Hicken,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 960360-CA
v.
North Ditch Irrigation
Company, Clayton Gardner, and
Robert Gappmayer,

F I L E D
(March 20, 1997)

Defendants and Appellees.

Fourth D i s t r i c t , Heber Department
The Honorable Guy R. Burningham
Attorneys:

Steven E. Clyde, Stephen B. Doxey, Amanda D. S e e g s r ,
and Lynda R. Krause, S a l t Lake City, f o r A p p e l l a n t s
Richard C. Skeen, David L. Arrington, and Bradley R.
Cahoon, S a l t Lake C i t y , f o r A p p e l l e e s

Before Judges Davis, Bench,, and~Jackson.
BENCH, Judge:
The 1960 findings state that plaintiffs had used the water
"to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." Relying on this finding,
plaintiffs contend that only irrigation rights were at issue in
the 1960 litigation. Because the findings are arguably ambiguous
on this point, plaintiffs are entitled to the inference that
stockwatering rights were not at issue in 1960. See Educators
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 890 P;2d
1029, 1029-30 (Utah 1995) (stating that on review of a trial
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, court views all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff).
We conclude, however, that any ambiguity in the findings or
decree was clarified by the 1984 proposed determination in the
general adjudication. The proposed determination, a copy of
which was attached to plaintiffs' complaint, states that
plaintiffs' water rights are based on the 1960 decree and
diligence claim. Plaintiffs' water user's claim, which was filed
during the general adjudication, also refers to the 1960 decree
and diligence claim. The proposed determination provides that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiffs1 claim "is limited to 2/240 interest" in the flow of
water, "which is intermittently diverted by" the claims of
plaintiffs and defendants. It then clearly defines the purposes
of plaintiffs' "2/240 interest": 3.80 acre-feet of water for
irrigation and 1.01 acre-feet of water for year-round
stockwatering. Therefore, the proposed determination
unambiguously shows that plaintiffs have a year-round
stockwatering right that, together with the irrigation right, is
limited to a 2/240 interest in the flow of water. Cfr Provo
River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993)
(concluding ambiguity in decree rendered it unlikely that all
rights were decided in prior adjudication) ; Orderville TnHgatinn

Co, Yi Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 285, 409 p.2d
616, 619 (1965) (stating res judicata does not bar action to
determine water rights "where there are uncertainties" in a prior
decree).
Plaintiffs did not object to the proposed determination
within ninety days of service, as required under Utah Code Ann,
§ 73-4-11 (1989). See Murdock v. Sprinoville Mun. Corp.. 878
P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). Therefore, because the-proposed
determination shows that plaintiffs' stockwatering claim was
previously adjudicated, they cannot prevail on their present
cause of action. £££. Green River Adiud. v. United States. 17
Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (emphasizing res
judicata applicable to general adjudications of water rights).
The trial court therefore properly dismissed plaintiff's
complaint. See Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) ...(-.stating.dismissal, prjoper-^only if the plaintiffs are not
entitled to-relief "under the facts alleged or under any set of
facts they could prove to support their claim").
Affirmed.
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